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CHINA’S PATTERN OF GROWTH: MOVING TO SUSTAINABILITY 









This paper studies the sources and pattern of China’s impressive economic growth over the last 
25 years, and shows that key issues currently of concern to policymakers—widening inequality, 
rural poverty, and resource intensity—are to a large extent rooted in China’s growth strategy, and 
resolving them requires a rebalancing of policies. Using both macro level and sector data and 
analyses, the paper extends the growth accounting framework to decompose the sources of labor 
productivity growth. We find that growth of industrial production, led by a massive investment 
effort that boosted the capital/labor ratio, has been the single most important factor driving GDP 
and overall labor productivity growth since the early 1990s. The shift of labor from low-
productivity agriculture has been limited, and, hence, contributed only marginally to overall labor 
productivity growth. The productivity gap between agriculture and the rest of the economy has 
continued to widen, leading to increased rural-urban income inequality. Looking ahead, we 
calibrate two alternative scenarios. We show that continuing with the current growth pattern 
would further increase already high investment and saving needs to unsustainable levels, lower 
urban employment growth, and widen the rural-urban income gap. Instead, reducing subsidies to 
industry and investment, encouraging the development of the services industry, and reducing 
barriers to labor mobility would result in a more balanced growth with an investment-to-GDP 
ratio that is consistent with medium-term saving trends, faster growth in urban employment, and a 
substantial reduction in the income gap between rural and urban residents.  
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China’s GDP growth has averaged 9.4 percent per annum since 1978. As a result of this 
impressive growth, millions of people were lifted out of poverty. Economic reforms implemented 
over the last 25 years have certainly been instrumental in the remarkable growth performance, 
leading to higher productivity growth than in the pre-reform period. Nevertheless, it is widely 
agreed that China’s growth during this period has been resource intensive, drawing heavily on 
physical capital, energy, and natural resources. In recent years, growth has also been associated 
with rising inequality. As China increasingly faces a widening rural-urban income divide and 
heavy demands on energy, water and other natural resources, and with savings expected to 
decline in the medium term, concerns are growing about the quality and sustainability of China’s 
growth.  
 
In this paper we: (1) identify some key features about the growth experience; (2) demonstrate the 
link between the pattern of growth and the effect on urban employment and income distribution; 
and (3) present two scenarios to answer the following questions: how sustainable is the current 
type of growth, and what kind of policy adjustment are necessary to achieve the government’s 
goals of urban employment growth and reduction of inequality? 
 
 
2. KEY FEATURES OF CHINA’S GROWTH 
 
2.1 Sources of Growth: Capital, Labor, and Total Factor Productivity 
 
A number of studies have used growth accounting to analyze the sources underlying China’s 
growth of the past 25 years. These studies assume a certain production technology and try to 
assess to what extent factor accumulation and total factor productivity (TFP) contributed to 
growth (see Heytens and Zebregs (2003) for a summary). While estimates differ due to variations 
in assumptions, the studies have converged on a number of findings. TFP growth contributed 
significantly to GDP growth, having increased since the introduction of reforms at the end of the 
1970s. Estimates of TFP growth during the reform period range between 2 and 4 percent per year. 
These studies also find that the contribution of physical capital accumulation has been large, 
reflecting a high and increasing investment to GDP ratio. Consistent with slowing overall 
employment growth, the contribution of labor growth has been modest, especially over the last 
decade. 
 
Our own growth accounting exercise for the 1978-2004 period finds similar results. We assume 
Cobb-Douglas technology, and a capital-output ratio of 2.4 in 1978 (as in Wang and Yao (2002), 
Chow (1993), and Hu and Khan (1997)), depreciation of 5 percent per year (as in Wang and Yao 
(2002)), and an elasticity of output with respect to labor of 0.5. We estimate that growth in the 
capital stock, which has averaged 10 percent per year, has contributed to more than half of GDP 
growth; TFP growth, at 3.3 percent per annum, contributed another one-third; and employment 
growth contributed the modest remainder.  
 
Moreover, splitting the sample into two periods, we find that, between 1993 and 2004, the 
contribution of capital accumulation to GDP growth was even higher, at 62 percent, while TFP 
growth slowed somewhat to 2.7 percent per year, contributing about 30 percent of GDP growth. 
Total employment growth has been very modest, accounting for only 6 percent of GDP growth.  
Meanwhile, the capital-output ratio is estimated to have risen from 2.2 in 1994 to 2.8 in 2004, 
reflecting the rapid investment growth in the last decade.   
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An alternative way of looking at these trends is to decompose labor productivity growth. Using 
the relationships from the Cobb-Douglass production function underlying the growth accounting 
exercise, we can decompose labor productivity growth into TFP growth and a term related to the 
increase in capital-intensity (the increase in the capital-labor ratio).  
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where Y is real GDP, A is total factor productivity (TFP), L is employment, and K is the capital 
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where y= Y/L, and k = K/L. From (2), the change in labor productivity over time is 
 
∂(y)/∂t = k
 1-α ∂A/∂t + A(1-α)k
-α ∂(k)/∂t                           (3) 
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With some manipulation, the above can be written as: 
 
g(y) = g(A) + (1-α)*g(k)                              (4) 
 
where g(x) denotes ∂(x)/∂t/x, the growth rate of x.  
 
We find that between 1978 and 1993, labor productivity rose by 7.0 percent on average each year 
while employment grew by 2.5 percent per annum. Slightly more than half of the increase in 
labor productivity stemmed from TFP growth, and the rest from the rise in the capital-labor ratio 
(Table 1). During 1993-2004, when investment as a share of GDP increased significantly, labor 
productivity rose by 7.8 percent per annum on average while employment growth declined to just 
over 1 percent a year. In this period, the contribution of TFP growth to labor productivity growth 
declined and the contribution of capital intensity rose to two-thirds.
1 These results underscore the 
increased importance of capital accumulation over the last decade. 
 
2.2 Sectoral Trends—the Role of Structural Changes and Shifts of Labor between Sectors 
 
Standard economic theory on development predicts that in a country with a large pool of surplus 
labor occupied in low-productivity agriculture, rapid growth and industrialization result in the 
relocation of agricultural labor into the non-agricultural sectors, where employment increases 
rapidly.
2 In the process, overall labor productivity increases because: (i) labor shifts from a less 
                                                 
1 Heytens and Zebregs (2003) assume varying TFP growth throughout the reform period and find some, but 
relatively modest, variation. 
2 See for instance Lewis (1954).  
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productive sector to more productive sectors, and (ii) “organic” productivity increases in each 
sector because of technology and institutional effects. 
 
  Table 1. Sources and aspects of growth (1978-2004)
          (average annual increase, in percent)
1978-93 1993-2004
GDP growth 9.7 9.0
Employment growth 2.5 1.1
Urban employment growth 5.2 2.9
Labor productivity growth 7.0 7.8
From TFP growth 3.7 2.7
From increasing K/L ratio 3.2 5.1
Memorandum item (in percent)
Investment/GDP ratio 30.2 36.8
At end-period
Share employment in agriculture 56.4 46.9
Source: NBS, and authors' estimates.  
 
The economy-wide capital-labor ratio should increase along the way because labor moves from a 
less capital-intensive sector to more capital intensive ones, and the sectors themselves also 
become more capital intensive. As labor moves out of agriculture, productivity there increases, 
and the productivity gap between agriculture and the other sectors declines over time. Therefore, 
as the economy grows, the share of employment in agriculture declines. Using cross-country data, 
figure 1 confirms the strong association between economic development and the share of total 
employment in agriculture. 
 
Figure 1. China and other countries: agricultural employment share and GDP per capita, 
(2001, unless otherwise specified)
Sources: World Development Indicators and NBS (for China).



























This pattern was replicated in China in the first 15 years of the reform period, but not since the 
mid-1990s. The share of agriculture in total employment declined from 70 percent in 1978 to 50 
percent in 1996 (Figure 2). However, since the mid-1990s, only limited further movement has 
taken place, in part also because of the demise of the township and village enterprises. In 
particular, after rising during the 1980s, the share of employment in industry has remained fairly 
stable since the end of the 1980s, despite remarkable growth in industry. Labor relocation from 
agriculture to services has been modest since the early 1990s, at ¾ percentage point of total 
employment per year. As a result, China now has a relatively high share of total employment in 
agriculture compared to other countries at a similar stage of development, although the shift out 
of agriculture in 2004 was significant. 
In the meantime, agriculture’s productivity gap with other sectors in China is high and rising 
(Figure 3). The ratio of productivity in industry and agriculture has been increasing spectacularly, 
from 5 in 1993 to a whopping 9 times in 2003 (in constant prices)—among the highest 
Figure 2. Employment share 
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Sources: NBS, and authors' estimates.
Figure 3. Labor productivity 

















3 Labor productivity in services has been between 3.4 and 3.7 times as high as in 




3. IDENTIFYING CHINA’S PATTERN OF GROWTH AND POLICY FACTORS 
 
Given the large surplus labor and large productivity gap between agriculture and the rest of the 
economy, why has so little reallocation of labor from agriculture to the higher productivity 
sectors taken place? Why has China’s economic growth led to such modest urban employment 
growth? The answer is directly tied to China’s growth pattern and the associated policies pursued. 
 
China’s pattern of growth especially since the early 1990s can be characterized as follows: 
 
•  The bulk of GDP growth since the early 1990s has come from explosive growth of industrial 
production. Industrial value added increased on average over 11 percent per year during 1993 
and 2004, and the share of industry in GDP rose from 38 percent in 1990 to 53 percent in 
2004 (Figure 4), the highest among countries for which the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicator database has data. In 2002-04, industry contributed around 2/3 of 
GDP growth. 
 
Over 90 percent of the growth in industry in 1993-2004 was in the form of labor productivity 
growth rather than employment growth, mainly led by a large-scale investment effort and 
increased capital-labor ratio. As a result, absorption of agricultural surplus labor was largely left 
to the service sector, and has been limited since the mid 1990s. Urban employment growth 
slowed from 5.4 percent per year during 1978-93 to 2.9 percent during 1993-2004. 
 
                                                 
3 The definition for industry used here is that of the “secondary” sector in the Chinese statistics, which 
includes mining (3.4 percent of GDP in 2003) and construction (7 percent of GDP in 2003). 
4 In current prices, the gap has varied more over time, as the terms of trade for agriculture have varied. 
Source: NBS, and authors' estimates.
Figure 4. Shares in value added 













•  The slow relocation of rural labor has hampered productivity growth in agriculture. 
Productivity is by far the most important determinant of income per worker. With overall 
agricultural output growth modest—and not, at the margin, depending significantly on the 
number of workers—the slow shift of labor has meant that per capita rural income growth has 
been low, leading to the widening rural-urban inequality. Indeed, the development of the 
productivity differentials can explain the development of the urban-rural income gap rather 
well (Figure 5).  
 
To further illustrate these findings, we decompose overall labor productivity growth into 
components related to a shift of labor between sectors and components related to “organic” 
productivity growth in each sector. Overall labor productivity Y/L is just 
(Y1+Y2+Y3)/(L1+L2+L3), where Yi, Li are production and labor in sector i respectively. This 
definition could be rewritten as 
 
y = ε1 y1+ ε 2 y2 + ε3 y3                             (5) 
 
where y is overall labor productivity, and yi is labor productivity in sector i, and εi is the share of 
sector i in total production. The derivative of the above equation is: 
 
∂y/∂t = ∂ε1/∂t*y1+ ε1∂ y1/∂t + ∂ε2/∂t*y2+ ε2∂ y2/∂t + ∂ε3/∂t*y3+ ε3∂ y3/∂t,                 (6) 
 
which means that the growth of overall labor productivity can be written as  
 
g(y) = g(ε1)*y1/y +ε1g(y1) y1/y + g(ε2)*y2/y +ε2g(y2) y2/y + g(ε3)*y3/y +ε3g(y3) y3/y.               (7) 
 
The first, third, and fifth terms combined capture the shift of labor between sectors, and the 
second, fourth, and sixth denote organic productivity growth in the three sectors. The 
decomposition results are shown in Table 2, and they confirm that the shift of labor from 
agriculture to other sectors has not been an important factor behind GDP growth in China, and 
“organic” labor productivity growth in industry is by far the most important factor.  
Source: NBS, and World Bank staff estimates.
Figure 5. Productivity gap between agriculture and other sectors and 




















Urban-rural income gap (ratio) (RHS)
Productivity gap agriculture-(industry and 
services) (ratio) (LHS) 
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In 1993-2003, the shift of labor into higher-productivity sectors contributed on average only 0.8 
percentage point to overall productivity growth of 7.7 percent per year. On the other hand, 
“organic” productivity growth in industry, contributed a spectacular 5.2 percentage point to 
overall productivity growth (2/3 of the total).  
 
Concerns about the quality of China’s macroeconomic data warrant caution. However, as 




Table 2. China: sectors' contribution to overall labor productivity 
growth (1978-2004) (average annual increase, in percent)
1978-93 1993-2004
Labor productivity 1/ 6.7 7.7
From shifts in employment b/t sectors 1.2 0.8




Sources: NBS, and authors' estimates.
1/ Artithmetic average, implying small differences with geometric averages used in the rest of the paper.  
 
 
The important roles of capital and industry in China’s economy are of course related. Industry 
requires more physical capital per worker than the service sector, and, accordingly, the share of 
income distributed to workers is lower in industry than in the services sector. Indeed, countries 
where industry is more important tend to invest more. 
 
The growth pattern described above generated very high GDP growth for China with only 
moderate urban employment growth, strikingly at odds with the theoretical expectation and most 
analyses/assumptions of what has happened in China. Indeed, the persistence and widening of 
large sectoral labor productivity gaps and the lower-than-expected flow of labor in the presence 
of those gaps points to market imperfections and/or government intervention. In the absence of 
market imperfections and government intervention, (i) more investment would be expected to 
take place in sectors other than industry, where the true marginal return to capital should be much 
higher than in industry; and (ii) labor should flow into industry where labor productivity is much 
higher than in other sectors.  
 
The current pattern of growth and resulting consequences for resource intensity and income 
inequality could be linked to the growth strategy the government has pursued in the past. The 
government has subsidized and favored industry and investment over the services sector and 
domestic consumption, especially at the local level, maybe partly because of incentives created 
by the system guiding promotion of local officials and the tax system, including the production-
based value added tax. For example: 
 
•  Industrialization was promoted by keeping the prices of energy, electricity, utilities 
(including water), and land low and by not having sufficiently strict environmental 
regulations or enforcement. While several energy subsidies have been removed, cheap  
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electricity for industry, due to subsidies on coal for power generation, continues to 
encourage the establishment of electricity-intensive industry (Bugs 2005). 
 
•  Financing was channeled on favorable terms to investment in industry, particularly to 
large enterprises and/or SOEs. Under the traditional financial system, the interest rate has 
been low for those who have had access, which has promoted capital intensive 
development in industry. The People’s Bank of China (2004) estimates that small and 
medium-sized enterprises—which are significantly more prevalent in services than in 
industry—account for more than half of GDP but receive less than 10 percent of total 
bank loans. The government’s channeling of financing to investment in infrastructure has 
also traditionally benefited industry in particular.  
 
•  Development of the services sector was not sufficiently stimulated. Service sector 
development suffers from restrictions and regulation and a lingering bias against private 
ownership (World Bank (2003)). 
 
•  Labor movements were restricted due to the Hukou system (Whalley and Zhang (2004)), 
discriminating regulations against migrant workers, non-portable labor and social 
benefits, and land tenure policies. Migration has taken place to a large extent only in the 
form of “floating” population. 
 
The overall result has been a subsidization of current production in industry, vis-à-vis current 
production in other sectors, future production, and environmental quality. The favoring of 
industry and investment does two things: in addition to the economic and social implications 
described above, the subsidization of input prices encourages a non-economic and not-sustainable 
use of energy and primary commodities, and degradation of the environment. 
 
 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE: SUSTAINABILITY OF GROWTH AND 
NECESSARY POLICY ADJUSTMENTS 
 
In this section, we calibrate two scenarios to illustrate the future implications of the continuation 
of the current growth pattern and the pay-off of a change in growth strategy and associated 
policies. The scenario on current policies assumes an unchanged growth strategy with current 
trends continuing, and an alternative scenario assumes less emphasis on and subsidization of 
industry and investment. The projections are made extending the growth accounting and sectoral 
shift analysis discussed in sections 2 and 3. The assumptions underlying the two scenarios are 
summarized in Table 3.  
 
As shown in Table 4, continued investment and industry-led growth in the scenario on current 
policies is almost certainly unsustainable. It would require the investment-to-GDP ratio reaching 
unprecedented high levels of 55 percent on average in 2014-24 in order to maintain GDP growth 
of 8 percent per year. In addition, the emphasis of continued investment in the industrial sector 
means that limited resources are devoted to development of the services industry. As a result, 
there would continue to be only moderate urban employment growth and a moderate labor flow 
out of agriculture, leaving a large share of people poor in agriculture. The productivity gap 
between agriculture and the rest of the economy would rise from an already high 6 times to over 8 
times by 2024, further widening the rural-urban income divide. In 2024, 33 percent of total 
employment would still be employed in agriculture, a high share for a country with a per capita 
income of $20,000 at that time (in 1995 prices). Resource intensity and environmental problems 
would also likely continue to intensify.  
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Table 3. Scenario assumptions 
 
Scenario on current policies: 
•  Annual GDP growth of 8 percent until 2024, driven by capital intensive growth in 
industry; 
•  Annual overall employment growth of 0.4 percent between 2004-14, and 0 percent 
between 2014-24, largely driven by demographics;
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•  A shift of labor from agriculture into services of 0.8 percentage point per year, as 
during 1993-2004;  
•  A small annual decline in the share of employment in industry, as during 1993-2004; 
•  Annual labor productivity growth in industry of 9.3 percent in 2004-24, compared to 
10 percent in 1993-2004; 
•  Annual overall TFP growth of 2.7 percent, as achieved during 1993-2004. 
 
Scenario with rebalanced policies: 
•  Annual real GDP growth of 8 percent until 2024, driven by more balanced growth 
between services and industry, and between TFP growth and urban employment on the 
one hand, and capital accumulation on the other hand; 
•  Annual overall employment growth of 0.8 percent between 2004-14, and 0.4 percent 
between 2014-24; 
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•  A shift of employment from agriculture into services of about 1.8 percentage point per 
year, as growth in services is stronger;  
•  A similarly small decline in the share of industry in total employment; 
•  Annual labor productivity growth in industry of 6.3 percent in 2004-24; 
•  Annual overall TFP growth of 3.5 percent, with most of the increase (compared to the 
scenario on current policies) coming from more reallocation of labor.  
 
 
Under the alternative scenario, growth would be more balanced: (i) between services and 
industry; and (ii) between TFP growth and urban employment on the one hand, and capital 
accumulation on the other hand. Continued rapid growth will require much less overall capital 
accumulation, with a more sustainable investment-to-GDP ratio (averaging 36 percent in 2014-24 
compared to 45 percent in 2004). This lower overall investment-to-GDP ratio would be more 
consistent with prospective long-term trends in demographics and saving. With less capital 
accumulation in industry and more investment in services, which is more labor intensive, urban 
employment will grow over 1½ percentage points per year faster, leading to more transfer of 
labor out of agriculture. As a result, labor productivity in agriculture will rise much faster, 
supporting higher incomes there. The decrease in the productivity gap between agriculture and 
the other sectors from 6 now to less than 3 by 2024 will strongly reduce urban-rural income 
                                                 
5 Given the very low benefits in China’s welfare system for most types of people, the natural 
unemployment rate will remain very low. Rather than assuming significant fluctuations in unemployment 
in the medium term, we assume no change in the unemployment ratio. For simplification, we assume that 
employment will grow in line with labor force growth, and that both will continue to lag growth of the 
working population age, continuing a trend of falling participation and employment rates.  
 
6 With a policy setting more in favor of employment creation, employment is assumed to grow in line with 
the working population (aged 15-64).  
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inequality. Finally, a lower share of industry in GDP will lower the resource intensity of growth 
and mean less environmental degradation. 
 
Table 4. China: Sources and aspects of growth (1993-2024)
(in percent)
On current policies With rebalanced policies
1993-2004 2004-14 2014-2024 2004-14 2014-2024
GDP growth 1/ 9.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
Total employment growth 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.4
Urban employment growth 2.9 1.7 1.2 3.4 2.9
Labor productivity growth 7.8 7.6 8.0 7.2 7.6
From TFP growth 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.5 3.5
From increasing capital-labor ratio 5.1 4.9 5.3 3.7 4.1
Memorandum item (period average, in percent)
Investment/GDP ratio 36.8 43.4 55.3 34.5 36.4
At end-period
Share employment in agriculture 46.9 41.1 33.4 31.3 12.5
Ratio productivity non agriculture- 5.7 7.3 8.2 4.7 2.3
agriculture
Source: NBS, and authors' estimatates.
1/ Potential GDP growth (in 2005, actual GDP growth is assumed to differ from potential GDP growth, 
in 2006-2024, actual GDP growth is assumed to equal potential GDP growth).  
 
Looking at international experience, the outcomes of the alternative scenario are quite achievable 
if policies are rebalanced. For example, the illustrative movement of the employment share of 
agriculture from 48 percent in 2004 to 15 percent in 2024 compares to a similar pace in South 
Korea, where it was reduced from 50 percent in 1973 to 10 percent in 2001. Malaysia decreased 
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Annex – Concerns about the data and the impact on the conclusions of this paper 
 
While concerns about the quality of China’s macroeconomic warrant caution, they are unlikely to 
change the conclusions of this paper substantially.  
 
First, there are concerns about how the “floating population is treated in the labor statistics. The 
floating population consists of people from rural areas who work in urban areas. They may not be 
correctly measured as working in services or industry, which would underestimate actual urban 
employment growth. The floating population is now estimated at about 140 million, up from 30 
million in 1983 and 75 million in 1995, and floating employment is now estimated at 100 million. 
We assume that 30 percent of the floating population works in industry, and 70 percent in 
services. Under the extreme assumption that all the floating employment is incorrectly counted as 
working in agriculture, and adjusting for that, the contributions to overall productivity growth 
would actually change little. The macro-economic implications summarized in Table 1 would not 
be affected. In terms of Table 2, the contribution of the labor shift would increase to 0.9 
percentage point, and the contribution of organic productivity growth in industry would be 4.8 
percentage points, still by far the largest component. The productivity gap between agriculture 
and other sectors would be significantly lower (3.3 in 2004, compared to 5.7). But even under this 
extreme assumption, the productivity gap between agriculture and industry would increase over 
time, from 3.9 in 1993 to 5.4 in 2004. 
 
Second, the size and growth of the services industry may be larger than the official data indicate. 
Making an extreme assumption that GDP is 30 percent underestimated purely on account of an 
underestimated services industry (that is, doubling the size of the services industry in 2004), up 
from an assumed 15 percent in 1993, would imply: (i) a lower investment to GDP ratio in 2004 
(33.7 compared to X); (ii) a lower capital stock to GDP ratio (2.2 compared to 2.8); and (iii) 
higher average TFP growth during 1993-2004—by 1.2 percentage point. But the contribution to 
labor productivity of an increasing capital-labor ratio would still be 5.1 out of 9 percentage 
points.  
 